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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

EDWARD A. RICHE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.

Case No. 20477

NORTH OGDEN PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION, a Utah
Professional Corporation,
Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues presented by this Appeal by Appellant
are:
1.

That

the Appellant

(Corporation) had

the

right to the redemption of its stock by virtue of
a Stock Redemption Agreement and by reason of the
restriction of transfer of corporate stock in Article
XII of the Articles of Incorporation.
2.

That the Respondent was a disqualified person

to hold shares in a Medical Professional Corporation,
in that the Respondent is not a licensed medical practitioner.

3.

That the Respondent is barred by the statute

of limitations in seeking a liquidation and dissolution
of the Corporation,
The

issues

4.

That

presented

on appeal by

Respondent

are:
the

appeal

should be dismissed

for

the reason that the interlocutory order is not a final
order from which an appeal can be taken.
5*

That

the

Statute

of Limitations has

run

against the Corporation in exercising the right of
redemption.
6.

That

the

Respondent

should be permitted

to liquidate the Corporation and take all the receivables
since the date of the filing of bankruptcy for purposes
of the liquidation.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant/Appellant, a professional Corporation,
employed Dr. Richard E. Nilsson, who was a stockholder.
Dr. Nilsson filed bankruptcy, first Chapter 13, and
then Chapter 7, in 1976.

Thereafter, the bankruptcy

court sold the shares of stock in the Corporation.
Plaintiff/Respondent purchased the stock and, because
he was not a qualified person, sought to dissolve
the Corporation.

The trial court determined

that

the Plaintiff/Respondent was the owner of the stock
2

and ruled that the Corporation had not redeemed the
stock within the contract or statutory period.

The

court further ruled that the parties should proceed
to liquidation of the Corporation.

Defendant appealed.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
PURPOSE OF SUIT FOR DISSOLUTION
To recover value of investment.
Since owner of the stock was not a professional ,
the only alternative was to dissolve the Corporation
and take out the real value.
The amount of the assets of the Corporation were
reflected in the income not in the property of par
value.

Since the Corporation owned the accounts receiv-

able, the real value was the income generated by the
employee doctors over the years.
Present value of the accounts receivable would
approximate 400,000 of which
would own 49.75%.

Plaintiff/Respondent

This is but one of the assets to

be distributed in the dissolution.
The case is not complete.
yet occurred.

The appeal

No dissolution has

is premature and

should

be disallowed.
The Statute of Limitations has not run, for the
contract was an executory contract and the statute
would not begin to run until the onset of the execution
3

of the contract.

Here, where the right to redeem

did not commence until the time for sale, (Rl), no
claim can be made that the statute of
had run.

limitations

The commencement of the lawsuit for purposes

of dissolution was well within the statutory period
of the right of redemption.

(July 15, 1983, R4) .

Said commencement of suit tolls the running of the
statute since liquidation is an alternative to redemption
under the terms of the contract and the statute (1611-13) .
To argue that the statute began to run at the
date of the filing of bankruptcy, which

Appellant

seems to be doing, is to argue that the stock was
available

for redemption by Appellant at the

of bankruptcy.

time

Not so, the asset was in the hands

of the trustee who did not offer it for sale until
1982.

At the time of the sale by the trustee the

ninety

(90) days began to run.

When no redemption

occurred during that period the statute of limitations
on dissolution (or liquidation) began.
21-25).

The suit was commenced

months later.

(R441, line

some thirteen

(13)

Note that the statute, 16-11-13, UCA

1953, requires the fair market value of the shares
of stock must be paid.
to sell for par.

The trustee was not obligated

The price of sale was not the fair

market value, for said value must be fixed at the
4

time of liquidation.

For the purposes of this Appeal,

Respondent alleges that the fair market value is the
value of the stock, leasehold, equipment and, of greatest
worth, all of the retained profit in the form of accounts
receivable for the years from the date of purchase
or bankruptcy until the time of dissolution (liquidation) .
Nilsson continued to be an employee of the Corporation
after his bankruptcy.

His earnings belonged to the

Corporation and he received a salary (R444, line 1920).

All expenses were paid by the Corporation from

the receivables.

Dr. Nilsson owned 49.+ percent of

the assets of the Corporation.

At sale, his interest

passed to the owner of the shares, which Respondent
makes no claim that the Corporation can continue with
him as the professional, yet he can and does claim
that either through purchase or liquidation he is
entitled to 49.+ percent of the assets, including
the receivables.
Appellant raises the statute of limitation as
an affirmative defense and sets the time for the commencement of the statute at the time of the disqualification
of the doctor.
premise.

The facts ring loudly against that

Dr. Nilsson continued to work as a physician;

he continued to assert an ownership in the Corporation
until the date of the actual sale of the stock.

Until

that date, the stock was not owned by a "disqualified"
5

shareholder.

Nilsson had not died; he had not retired;

he had simply placed his stock in the hands of the
bankruptcy trustee who exercised no control nor ownership
over said stock until the date of sale.

The Appellant

cannot claim a right which did not exist under the
agreement or the statutes until the substitution of
Respondent for Nilsson.
of sale.

That occurred on the date

(September 20, 1982) (R75).

Indeed, the

shares of stock were not transferred to Respondent
until the commencement of the suit, subject to this
appeal, as per the order of the bankruptcy judge,
dated November 9, 1982, (R77).

Under the terms of

the redemption agreement and under the statute, disqualification does not occur until: (1) sale (R57),
(2) termination of employment or, (3) death.

Since

Nilsson continues to be employed (has not died) the
qualifier in this case is "sale."

The restrictions

of the sale are such that the company may, prior to
any such sale, redeem said stock at par value.
Note: "prior to any such sale . . . ."

(R59).

Since the

sale was unique and Appellant takes the position that
the Statute of Limitations had already run on the
legal exercise of their rights or the rights of the
trustee, the entire redemption concept was passe 1 .
If the Statute of Limitations had run, then no disqualification of Respondent could occur; no right of redemption
6

could occur except as set by the legislature,

16-

11-13, UCA.
Nilsson was not disqualified until he lost his
shares by sale to Respondent.

If, as the Appellant

would have us believe, the statute commenced to run
as of the date of the filing of bankruptcy, then the
right of redemption, the entire agreement under which
the Appellant claims ownership of the stock, was outlawed
by the statute of limitations in 1980.

Since a sale

did not occur until October 19, 1982, the disqualifications, under the redemption provisions of the statute
(16-11-13, UCA), did not occur until the sale.

Certainly

the claim by the Appellant that the trustee became
the owner of the shares cannot stand.

Ownership,

under the terms of the agreement, statute, or common
law, came about only by purchase.

All legal proceedings

under contemplation or under way are stayed by the
filing of bankruptcy.
See §454, Bankruptcy, 9 Am Jur 2d, where it is
said,
Thus, the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 provides
for an automatic stay of virtually all activities
adversely affecting the debtor or debtor's
property. To insure that prejudice resulting
from this stay are minimized, the code also
provides for relief from the stays and for
a tolling of limitation which might otherwise
cause the availability of the stayed remedies
to lapse.

7

Certainly, the bankruptcy act may not be used
to defeat claims by permitting a debtor to stay proceedings
and then escape said proceedings by saying at the
propitious time, "I'll dismiss my bankruptcy action,
for the Statute of Limitations has now run on your
claim."

This seems to be the obvious claim by the

Appellant here.
On the other hand, if the statute did run, the
right of redemption asserted in the statute and the
private agreement is moot since no offer of redemption
was made within ninety (90) days.

Thus, Judge Wahlquist

was correct in his finding that the order was interlocutory
and there remains the necessity of liquidation or
dissolution which the lawsuit is all about. (R3).

POINT TWO
APPELLANT HAD RIGHT TO REDEMPTION OF SHARES
OF STOCK PREVIOUSLY ISSUED TO A QUALIFIED
HOLDER.
Appellant
can

be

no

the

statute

(16-11-13)

(R75).

the

to

Said

redeem.

right

and u n d e r

redemption

was

Of t h a t
created

a private

period

there

was

under

agreement.

ninety

(90)

Arguendo n i n e t y ( 9 0 ) d a y s from d a t e of b a n k r u p t c y

( J u l y 9,
days

a right

question.

In each c a s e ,
days.

had

1976, August

from

sale

to

Appellant

2,

1976)

Respondent
did

not

(R159),

(September

attempt
8

or n i n e t y

to

(90)

20,

1982),

redeem

within

either period. (R355, line 8-17, R403, line 19-24,
R406) .
Since no exercise of that right was made within
the ninety

(90) day period, either of transfer to

the trustee or sale to Respondent, Appellant cannot
now be heard to assert a right which was limited to
ninety

(90) days, both by the private agreement and

by statute.

If such a right existed, it has

long

since been extinguished by operation of law.

POINT THREE
A STOCK REPURCHASE AGREEMENT IS NOT AN UNREASONABLE RESTRAINT ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY.
If a stock

repurchase agreement

sets a value

and a limit as to its exercise, there can be no doubt
that such an agreement is not a restraint of trade.
The statute fixes a date of such redemption at bargain
and fixes said redemption date as ninety
from sale or disqualification.

(90) days

If no exercise

is

made of the bargain purchase, then the statute says
that the liquidation of the Corporation is the only
alternative.

"if the Corporation shall fail to purchase

said shares by the end of said ninety (90) days, then
. . . any disqualified shareholder may bring an action
. . . to order the liquidation of the Corporation." (1611-13, UCA). This the Respondent has done.
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The liquidation

(dissolution) has yet to occur

and thus the Supreme Court should remand to the District
Court for dissolution or liquidation.

POINT FOUR
APPELLANT ALLEGES THAT AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
OF AN EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL, WAIVER AND RES
JUDICATA ARE DETERMINATIVE IN DENIAL OF
CAUSE OF ACTION IN RESPONDENT.
Certainly, Respondent has not waivered
determination to liquidate the Corporation,

in his
acquire

such assets as he might and obtain what he could not
obtain by reason of the bankruptcy action by the Appellant,

As a result of the bankruptcy filing, Respondent

lost a substantial amount of money.

As a result of

his dogged persistence in purchase of shares, attempts
to liquidate and obtain his share of his Corporation,
he is not guilty of any act giving rise to estoppel.
At the time of the purchase of the shares, confirmed
by

the Court in November, 1982, Respondent

until appeal time ran

(from Judge Mabey's

waited
ruling)

until redemption time ran, and until efforts to settle
on an amicable basis with his

fellow

and then filed his suit to dissolve.
suggested

shareholders
Judge

Mabey

just such an activity in his transfer of

the issue relating to the entitlement of said stock
itself to the court wherein litigation may be commenced
between the parties.
10

The issue of estoppel, failure to file briefs,
or other arguments counsel raises as to Respondent's
obtaining of the stock were settled by Judge Mabey
in the November 1982 Order on Order to Show Cause. (7677).

Those issues were raised in the hearing before

Judge Mabey and disposed of by the Judge.
The issues presented by this appeal by Respondent
are:
POINT FIVE
THAT THE A P P E A L SHOULD BE D I S M I S S E D FOR
THE REASON THAT THE ORDER I S NOT A FINAL
ORDER FROM WHICH AN APPEAL CAN BE TAKEN.
As

set

forth

January

25,

1985,

in

Judge

(R332)

Wahlquist1 s

Judge

ruling,

Wahlquist

dated

viewed

the

o r d e r s a s i n t e r m e d i a t e o r d e r s and n o t t h e r e f o r e a p p e a l a b l e .

POINT SIX
THAT THE STATUTE OF L I M I T A T I O N S HAD RUN
AGAINST THE CORPORATION IN E X E R C I S I N G THE
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION.
Since

on

the

date

of

the

filing

of

bankruptcy,

t h e o w n e r s h i p of s t o c k p a s s e d t o t h e t r u s t e e i n b a n k r u p t c y
the

six

year

written

instruments

run a g a i n s t
Such
against
Thus,

statute

the

the

and

limitation
their

(78-12-23,

enforcement

UCA)

began

to

Corporation.

statute

the

of

was

not

Corporation,
Corporation

tolled

only
had

11

by

the

against

a maximum o f

bankruptcy

the
six

bankrupt.
years

to

exercise the option granted under the written agreement.
Since no effort was made to redeem during that period,
the Corporation lost its right to redeem under the
written instrument or contract.

Under the statute,

the right to redeem was lost ninety (90) days after
the stock was passed to a disqualified stockholder. (1611-13, UCA).

POINT SEVEN
THAT THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE PERMITTED
TO LIQUIDATE THE CORPORATION AND TAKE ALL
RECEIVABLES SINCE THE DATE OF THE FILING
OF BANKRUPTCY FOR PURPOSES OF THE LIQUIDATION.
Since the suit from which this appeal is taken
is for the dissolution (liquidation) of a professional
corporation, and since the issue on appeal seems to
be only that the stock could be redeemed at par, the
observe of that issue is which is the "fair" value
of the stock for purposes of liquidation as set forth
in 16-11-13.

The fair value concept, as contemplated

by the statute, had to do with the total value of
the Corporation.

Such liquidation

is governed

procedured means of establishing value.

by

Par is not

the price; fair value establishes the price or what
is available for distribution after liquidation as
set forth in 16-10-92 and 16-10-93, UCA.
The statute further provides that in the dissolution
of a corporation, the property and assets
12

remaining,

after payment of claims and debts# shall be distributed
to its shareholders.

Strict accounting of all property

and assets must occur from the time Nilsson was first
disqualified

(the date of filing bankruptcy) until

the date of liquidation.

No other action would satisfy

the statute with respect to dissolution.

CONCLUSION
Judge Wahlquist stated that the orders and decree
from which this appeal
and

that

is taken were

intermediate

the matter was not yet ripe for appeal.

Appellant claims that the court was wrong in ratifying
the sale by the bankruptcy court and that, further,
Plaintiff/Respondent had no claim on the Corporation
beyond the par value of the stock.

The trial court

correctly analyzed the relationship between the parties
and ordered further proceedings to result in a liquidation
of the Corporation.
this

Respondent now suggests

Court should uphold Judge Wahlquist's

that

ruling

and return the matter to the District Court for dissolution
and liquidation.

w

Respectfully submitted this

(&

day of June,

1985.
JOHN Vf. SAMPSON, ESQ.
'
2650 Washington Boulevard
Suite 102
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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Certificate of Mailing
Comes now counsel for the Plaintiff and Respondent
and certified to the Court that ten (10) copies of
the Respondent's Brief were posted or delivered to
the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah,
332 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
and that four copies were mailed Defendant and Appellant,
by posting

same in the U.S. Mail, postage

prepaid

and addressed to Pete N. Vlahos, 2447 Kiesel Avenue,
Ogden, Utah 84401, this (p

day of June, 1985.

/'SECRETXRY

*^>
>

14

